Trump, Russia, Ukraine and Iran: A Different Foreign Policy or a Political Strategy?
The return of Donald Trump to the White House has
fundamentally changed the way the United States approaches Russia, Ukraine,
Iran, Europe, China and its traditional allies.
The central question is no longer simply whether Trump
is “pro-Russian” or “anti-Russian”. The more important question is whether his
foreign policy represents a coherent new strategy — America First, economic
pressure, negotiation and military strength — or whether some of his
decisions are also strongly influenced by domestic American politics and the
need to demonstrate to American voters that he can accomplish what previous
presidents could not.
This question becomes particularly important when
comparing his promises concerning Ukraine with his actions concerning Iran.
1. What did the
United States do to Russia after the 2022 invasion?
After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of
Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the United States imposed an exceptionally
extensive sanctions regime against Moscow.
Among the principal measures were:
- sanctions against Russia's largest banks;
- freezing of Russian assets under U.S. jurisdiction;
- restrictions on Russia's access to international financial markets;
- restrictions on Russian sovereign debt and financing;
- sanctions against Vladimir Putin, senior officials and oligarchs;
- export controls on semiconductors, advanced technology and industrial
equipment;
- severe restrictions on Russia's defence industry;
- subsequent measures against oil, gas, metals, diamonds and other
sectors;
- sanctions against companies and individuals in third countries accused
of helping Russia evade Western sanctions.
The objective was therefore much broader than simply
punishing individual Russian officials.
Washington attempted to weaken Russia's economic,
financial, technological and military capacity to continue the war.
The United States and its allies also established
mechanisms such as the G7 price-cap system for Russian oil. As of August 2026,
the U.S. price cap remains at $60 per barrel, while the EU, UK and Canada have
adopted a lower threshold of $44.10.
2. Biden continued to expand the sanctions regime
An important point is that the sanctions imposed under
President Joe Biden did not simply remain frozen after 2022.
They were progressively expanded.
For example:
- In February 2024, Washington announced hundreds of additional
designations following the death of Russian opposition leader Alexei
Navalny.
- In May and June 2024, the United States imposed hundreds of additional
sanctions, including against companies and financial institutions helping
Russia obtain foreign technology.
- In November 2024, the United States sanctioned Gazprombank, one
of Russia's most important remaining financial channels.
- And on 10 January 2025, shortly before Trump returned to
office, the Biden administration launched one of its most important attacks
on Russia's energy sector.
That January package targeted:
- Gazprom Neft;
- Surgutneftegas;
- more than 180 vessels;
- oil traders;
- oil-service companies;
- insurers;
- and other participants in Russia's petroleum industry.
The declared objective was to strike at one of the
principal sources of revenue financing the Russian state and its war effort.
Thus, Trump inherited an extraordinarily extensive
sanctions system.
3. What changed when Trump returned to the presidency?
Donald Trump returned to the White House on 20
January 2025.
He did not simply abolish Biden's sanctions against
Russia.
The extensive sanctions architecture remained largely
in place. A recent British House of Commons review published in August 2026
confirms that the extensive U.S., EU and UK sanctions regimes established after
the 2022 invasion remain in force, although there has been concern about
weakening coordination between the United States and its European allies under
Trump's different Ukraine strategy.
But Trump changed the purpose and political use
of sanctions.
Under Biden, the basic philosophy was:
Increase the economic cost to Russia until Moscow
changes its behaviour.
Under Trump, sanctions became increasingly:
A negotiating weapon to force Russia to accept an
agreement.
That distinction is extremely important.
Trump repeatedly demonstrated that he was prepared to
use pressure, but he also wanted to keep a channel open to Vladimir Putin.
4. Trump did not simply become “soft” on Russia
It would therefore be inaccurate to say:
“Trump removed Biden's sanctions and became generous
towards Russia.”
That is not what happened.
Trump's administration has also imposed serious
sanctions on Russia.
One of the clearest examples was the decision to
sanction Rosneft and Lukoil, two of Russia's most important oil
companies.
This demonstrated that Trump was prepared to attack
Russia's energy revenues when he concluded that Putin was not responding to
diplomatic pressure.
Furthermore, in 2026, the G7 continued to discuss
increasing pressure on Russia's oil and gas sector. The G7 leaders explicitly
committed to increasing pressure on the Russian war economy.
So Trump's policy is better described as:
pressure + negotiation + threats of escalation +
willingness to reduce pressure if negotiations produce results.
5. The most important difference: Trump also began pressuring America's
allies
This is where your original question becomes
particularly interesting.
Trump has not restricted his economic pressure to
Russia.
He has also imposed or threatened major tariffs
against:
- the European Union;
- Canada;
- Mexico;
- China;
- and other trading partners.
But there is an important distinction.
These tariffs are not technically the same thing as
sanctions against Russia.
Against Russia, the United States has used:
- financial sanctions;
- asset freezes;
- banking restrictions;
- export controls;
- energy sanctions;
- sanctions against individuals and companies.
Against allies such as Canada and European countries,
Trump has generally used:
- tariffs;
- trade restrictions;
- threats of tariffs;
- negotiations over trade deficits;
- pressure over NATO spending;
- and demands relating to economic and strategic burden-sharing.
Nevertheless, from a political point of view,
something remarkable has happened:
Trump has
sometimes spoken to America's traditional allies in terms more characteristic
of economic confrontation than partnership.
This is one of the major differences between his
foreign policy and that of Biden.
6. Then came Iran — and the situation became much more complicated
This is where I think your argument becomes
particularly worth examining.
Trump returned to office promising to prevent Iran
from obtaining a nuclear weapon.
But the conflict that subsequently developed went much
further than a conventional sanctions campaign.
On 28 February 2026, the United States and
Israel launched major military strikes against Iran.
According to current reporting, the conflict
subsequently became a prolonged war involving Iranian retaliation, attacks
affecting U.S. and allied positions, disruption of shipping through the Strait
of Hormuz and major damage to Iranian infrastructure.
Trump publicly presented several objectives:
1. prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon;
2. destroy or severely damage Iran's nuclear infrastructure;
3. destroy Iran's missile capabilities;
4. weaken the Iranian military;
5. pressure the Iranian government;
6. encourage the Iranian people to oppose the regime.
CBS reported that Trump's initial war aims included
destroying Iranian missiles, preventing reconstruction of the nuclear programme
and creating conditions for Iranians to “take over” their government.
7. But did Trump really go to war to “liberate the Iranian people”?
This is where we need to be very careful.
Trump has certainly spoken about the Iranian people
and encouraged them to oppose their government.
In April 2026, when asked what he would think if
Iranians rose against their regime during a ceasefire, Trump replied that they
should do it, while simultaneously saying that Iran could not be allowed to
obtain a nuclear weapon.
But Trump has also explicitly denied that regime
change was the original purpose of the war.
In June 2026, he said:
“I didn't do this for regime change…”
Reuters recorded the statement during the G7 period.
This creates an important contradiction.
Trump's public position has effectively evolved from:
“We are not necessarily seeking regime change”
towards:
“If the Iranian regime changes as a consequence, that
would be a good outcome.”
That is different from saying that regime change was
the original formal objective.
8. And what about Iranian women?
Trump has repeatedly referred to Iranian protesters
and women, but the evidence does not demonstrate that the war has
liberated Iranian women.
Quite the opposite.
The situation inside Iran remains extremely difficult.
In April 2026, Trump claimed that eight Iranian women
would not be executed following his intervention. Iranian authorities disputed
his entire account, saying that the executions had not been planned as Trump
described.
More recently, Reuters reported that the Iranian
authorities have responded to the economic and political pressure by intensifying
repression against dissidents, while the war has caused severe economic
hardship among ordinary Iranians.
Therefore, the claim:
“The war liberated Iranian women”
cannot presently be supported by the evidence.
At most, Trump has presented his policy as supporting
the Iranian people against their government.
That is a political objective and a rhetoric of liberation
— not the same thing as actually achieving liberation.
9. The nuclear argument is much stronger than the “liberation” argument
There is, however, a much more substantial argument
behind Trump's nuclear justification.
Before the war, Iran had accumulated uranium enriched
to 60%, far above the level normally associated with civilian nuclear
power, although still below the roughly 90% enrichment generally associated
with weapons-grade uranium.
The IAEA and other international actors were deeply
concerned about Iran's stockpile and the deterioration of international
monitoring.
Reuters reported that Iran had possessed approximately
440.9 kg of uranium enriched to 60% before the strikes, although
precisely determining what survived the attacks has become difficult.
The United States and Israel therefore had a genuine
strategic concern:
Could Iran eventually develop a nuclear weapon?
That concern was not invented by Trump.
It existed long before him.
10. But did the war actually solve the nuclear problem?
This is where the Trump administration's claim becomes
much more difficult to evaluate.
The United States and Israel heavily damaged Iranian
nuclear facilities.
But military strikes do not automatically eliminate:
- scientific knowledge;
- nuclear expertise;
- underground facilities;
- uranium stockpiles;
- the ability to rebuild;
- or the political motivation to pursue nuclear deterrence.
Reuters reported that a significant quantity of
enriched uranium may have survived the initial attacks and that the IAEA faced
difficulties establishing exactly what remained.
In June, Trump reached an interim memorandum with Iran
that was intended to establish a ceasefire and open negotiations concerning
Iran's nuclear programme. The agreement included provisions concerning
international inspections.
But that agreement subsequently collapsed.
By August 2026, the 60-day negotiation period had
expired without a durable settlement.
Trump declared the agreement effectively void, while
Iran demanded the lifting of the U.S. blockade and sanctions, release of frozen
Iranian assets and an end to military threats.
And as of 23 August 2026, the nuclear question
is therefore not definitively resolved.
11. This brings us back to Trump's promise about Ukraine
During the 2024 presidential campaign, Trump
repeatedly said that he could end the Russia-Ukraine war within 24 hours
if he returned to the presidency.
That was a very powerful political message.
Reuters documented the promise and reported that Trump
did not publicly explain precisely how he would accomplish it.
This is politically significant.
Trump was essentially telling American voters:
“The war continues because Biden is weak and
incompetent. I am strong enough to make Putin and Zelensky negotiate.”
That is an extremely effective campaign argument.
But there is an enormous difference between:
promising to end a war in 24 hours
and
actually being able to make two sovereign governments
accept a peace agreement.
Russia has its own objectives.
Ukraine has its own objectives.
And neither Putin nor Zelensky is simply an employee
of the American president.
12. The 24-hour promise has therefore become a major political problem for
Trump
Trump did not end the Ukraine war within 24 hours of
becoming president.
The war continued.
And as of August 2026, it is still continuing.
Just this week, President Zelenskyy warned that Russia
may mobilize another 300,000 troops after its September parliamentary
elections, while Russia continues fighting in eastern Ukraine.
So the political promise made during the election
campaign has not been fulfilled.
That does not necessarily prove that Trump
deliberately lied.
A president can genuinely believe that his negotiating
ability will produce a result and subsequently discover that reality is much
more complicated.
But it does demonstrate something important:
The “24-hour”
promise was much easier to make during an election campaign than to implement
from the Oval Office.
13. Was the 24-hour promise therefore a way of winning votes?
This is where I would be cautious.
We cannot prove Trump's private intention.
But politically, the statement clearly had value.
Trump could present himself as:
- the candidate of peace;
- the candidate of strength;
- the candidate who would stop American money being sent abroad;
- the candidate who would not allow Ukraine to become an endless
American commitment;
- and the candidate who could personally negotiate with Putin.
Those arguments were useful during the election.
Therefore, I think the intellectually honest
conclusion is:
It is reasonable to examine Trump's 24-hour promise as
part of his electoral strategy, but it is not possible to prove that electoral
considerations were the sole or primary reason he made the promise.
That distinction is essential if we want the analysis
to remain credible.
14. The comparison between Russia and Iran is fascinating
Trump's approach to Russia and Iran reveals a
recurring pattern.
With Russia:
Pressure → negotiation → threat of more sanctions → negotiation
again.
With Iran:
Military force → destruction of
nuclear/military infrastructure → pressure → negotiation → collapse of the agreement → renewed
pressure.
This suggests that Trump is not fundamentally opposed
to negotiations.
Quite the opposite.
He appears to believe that:
The United States should first demonstrate
overwhelming strength and then negotiate from a position of superiority.
That is the essence of Trump's frequently repeated
philosophy of “peace through strength.”
15. But there is a contradiction in Trump's foreign policy
Here is, in my view, one of the most important
political contradictions.
Trump criticizes previous administrations for becoming
involved in endless foreign wars.
Yet his presidency has now become involved in a major
military conflict with Iran that has lasted for months.
Meanwhile, the Russia-Ukraine war — which he promised
to end in 24 hours — is still continuing.
This creates an uncomfortable comparison:
|
Trump promise / objective |
Current reality |
|
End Ukraine war in 24 hours |
War continues in August 2026 |
|
Prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon |
Nuclear question remains unresolved |
|
Avoid endless wars |
U.S. has become directly involved in a prolonged Iran conflict |
|
Pressure Russia into peace |
Russia continues fighting |
|
Help the Iranian people |
Iranian repression and economic hardship continue |
|
Use strength to achieve peace |
Military strength has not yet produced a durable Iranian settlement |
This does not necessarily mean that Trump's policy has
“failed” in every respect.
But it demonstrates that military power does not
automatically produce political solutions.
16. And now the domestic political factor becomes impossible to ignore
There is another development that deserves attention.
The American midterm elections are approaching.
Reuters/Ipsos reported in August 2026 that Trump's
approval rating had fallen to 33%, its lowest point of his presidency,
while only 20% of Americans surveyed said the Iran war had been worthwhile.
The war has also contributed to higher energy prices and economic pressure
inside the United States.
Trump insists that electoral considerations are not
determining his decisions.
But politically, the situation is obvious:
A prolonged war
+ higher fuel prices + inflation + declining approval = a serious political
problem before the midterms.
That does not prove that Trump started the war for
electoral reasons.
But it means that the political consequences of the
war are now inseparable from his presidency.
17. The most interesting comparison: Russia versus America's allies
And this takes us back to the question you originally
asked me.
Trump has sometimes been:
extremely
aggressive toward America's traditional allies economically
while simultaneously maintaining a willingness to
negotiate with Russia.
This has caused considerable concern in Europe.
The United Kingdom and EU continue to strengthen
sanctions against Russia. For example, the UK announced another major Russia
sanctions package on 6 August 2026, targeting Russian banks, the oil and
gas sector and the so-called shadow fleet.
Ukraine is also continuing to demand greater sanctions
pressure against Russia.
Thus, there is now a genuine divergence:
Europe:
“Increase pressure on Russia until it ends the war.”
Trump:
“Use pressure, but keep the door open for a deal with
Putin.”
That difference is politically significant.
18. My overall assessment
If I were to reduce the entire situation to one
sentence, I would put it this way:
Trump does not appear to have a simple “pro-Russia” or
“anti-Russia” foreign policy; rather, he appears to believe that American power
— military, economic and political — should be used transactionally to force
other governments to negotiate on terms favourable to Washington.
This explains why Trump can simultaneously:
- sanction Russian oil companies;
- threaten countries buying Russian oil;
- pressure European allies;
- impose tariffs on Canada and Europe;
- confront China;
- negotiate with Putin;
- attack Iran;
- encourage Iranians to oppose their government;
- and then attempt to negotiate with Tehran.
At first sight this looks contradictory.
But there is a common thread:
Trump wants the
United States to hold the strongest negotiating position.
19. And your hypothesis about the Ukraine war and the election
Your hypothesis deserves to be considered, but I would
formulate it slightly differently.
Rather than saying:
“Trump invented the 24-hour promise simply to win
votes.”
I would say:
“Trump's promise to end the Russia-Ukraine war within
24 hours was politically powerful because it allowed him to present himself to
American voters as the uniquely capable leader who could achieve peace where
Biden had failed. Whether this was primarily electoral rhetoric or a genuine
belief in his negotiating ability cannot be established with certainty. What
can be established is that the promise has not been fulfilled, and the war
remains active in August 2026.”
That is a much stronger argument because it
separates evidence from interpretation.
And the same principle should be applied to Iran.
We can say:
Trump presented the Iran war as necessary to prevent
Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and increasingly as an opportunity for the
Iranian people to challenge their government.
But we should not state as an established fact that
he started the war to win the midterm elections or to liberate Iranian women.
The evidence simply does not prove that.
20. The
situation as of 23 August 2026
The most recent developments make the picture even
more striking:
- The Iran conflict remains unresolved.
- The June U.S.-Iran interim agreement has effectively collapsed.
- The Strait of Hormuz remains a major point of confrontation,
with enormous consequences for world energy markets.
- Washington is threatening what its Treasury secretary describes as
extremely severe new sanctions against Iran.
- Iran says the American strategy has failed to achieve its principal
objectives, including dismantling its nuclear programme and producing
regime change.
- Meanwhile, the Russia-Ukraine war continues, with Russia
reportedly preparing additional military mobilization.
- European allies continue to push for stronger sanctions against
Russia.
- And Trump faces significant domestic political pressure as Americans
become increasingly concerned about the cost and duration of the Iran
conflict.
So,
paradoxically, Trump's presidency has not produced the “quick peace” he
promised.
Instead, America now finds itself simultaneously
dealing with:
Russia + Ukraine + Iran + China + Europe + NATO +
global energy disruption + domestic political pressure.
That is a much more complicated world than the one
Trump described during his campaign.
The central
question
And perhaps this is the question that would make the
strongest conclusion for the political article I have developed:
If Donald Trump promised American voters that his
strength could end wars quickly, but his presidency has instead left the United
States confronting an unresolved war in Ukraine and a prolonged conflict with
Iran, should his foreign policy be judged by the strength of the pressure he
applies — or by the peace that pressure actually produces?
SAISI
